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Summary  There  have  been  many  calls  for  improved  detection  of  zoonoses;
research  has  not  yet  characterized  zoonotic  disease  detection  in  the  United  States,
in  humans  or  animals.  This  research  reviewed  ‘‘who  detects’’  zoonotic  disease  out-
breaks  and  ‘‘how  fast’’  they  are  detected.  Deﬁnitions  were  operationalized  based
on  existing  literature  and  current  practice.  An  outbreak  database  was  created  from
publicly  available  records:  Morbidity  and  Mortality  Weekly  Reports  and  ProMed-
Mail.  Univariate  and  bivariate  statistics—–including  chi-square  tests,  Kruskal—Wallis
tests,  and  Dunn’s  method  were  used  for  analysis.  From  an  n  =  101,  results  showed
that  laboratories  (human  health)  detected  32.7%  (n  =  33)  of  the  outbreaks;  physi-
cians/clinicians  (human  health)  detected  18.8%  (n  =  19).  The  median  time  to  was
13  days;  mean  was  31.7  (range  =  0—492).  There  was  a  relationship  between  the  type
of  the  entity  (laboratory,  practitioner,  or  state  agency)  and  how  fast  the  outbreak
was  detected;  state  agencies  were  slower  in  detection.  There  was  also  a signif-
icant  relationship  between  how  fast  an  outbreak  was  detected  and  whether  the
outbreak  occurred  in  multiple  regions.  This  research  provides  important  empirical
evidence  regarding  U.S.  zoonotic  disease  outbreak  detection,  highlighting  the  difﬁ-
culty  in  rapid  detection  of  multi-state  outbreaks  and  the  need  for  rapid,  sensitive
diagnostic  testing  and  astute  practitioners.
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oharacterizing  zoonotic  disease  detection  in  US  
ntroduction
oonotic  diseases  are  a  signiﬁcant  threat  to  public
ealth;  approximately  half  of  the  1700  pathogens
hat are  known  to  infect  humans  are  zoonoses
1,2].  However,  the  different  states  in  the  United
tates have  widely  varying  requirements  and  capa-
ilities for  zoonotic  disease  outbreak  detection  and
eporting  [3—5].  Both  public  and  private  stakehol-
ers have  argued  that  improved  zoonotic  disease
utbreak detection  is critically  important,  and  a
ystematic,  federal  integration  of  veterinary  and
uman disease  surveillance  and  reporting  should  be
onsidered [6—8]. The  existing  literature  has  not
et presented  empirical  evidence  describing  the
urrent  characteristics  of  disease  outbreak  detec-
ion in  the  United  States  speciﬁcally  for  zoonoses.
This research,  which  is based  on  a  database
f disease  outbreaks  constructed  by  reviewing  the
ublicly  available  literature  from  1998  to  2008,
mpirically  analyzed  the  characteristics  of  zoonotic
isease  outbreaks  in  the  United  States.  In  particu-
ar, it  focused  on  who  detected  these  outbreaks,
ow fast  they  were  detected,  and  the  relation-
hip between  these  variables.  Similar  research  has
een conducted  [9—11], but  prior  analyses  have
ot speciﬁcally  focused  on  zoonotic  diseases  or
escribed  the  relationship  between  who  detected
he outbreak  and  the  speed  of  detection.
Because of  the  disconnect  between  animal
ealth and  public  health  disease  detection  systems
6—8],  as  well  as  capability  and  policy  differences
etween the  states  in  the  United  States  [5], this
ype of  information  is  critical  to  obtain  a bet-
er understanding  of  the  factors  that  may  delay
oonotic disease  outbreak  detection  and  thereby
otentially threaten  public  health.  The  results
resented in  this  manuscript  provide  empirical
escriptive and  quantitative  information  about  the
ctual practice  of  zoonotic  disease  detection  in  the
nited States,  and  the  results  may  inform  public
olicy.
ethods
dentifying zoonotic diseases of interest
o  identify  zoonotic  diseases  of  interest,  three
rimary lists  were  consulted:  the  U.S.  Centers
or Disease  Control  and  Prevention  (CDC)  Nation-
lly Notiﬁable  Disease  List  (all  diseases  that
ffect humans);  the  World  Organization  for  Animal
ealth  (OIE)  Reportable  Disease  List  (all  diseases
hat affect  animals);  and  a  U.S.  Department  of
o
t
[195
griculture  (USDA)  list  of  wildlife  disease  agents  of
oncern (all  diseases  that  affect  wild  animals).  All
on-zoonotic  diseases  were  immediately  removed
rom  the  potential  pool.
Subsequently,  the  following  process  was  fol-
owed. First,  any  zoonotic  disease  listed  on  both
he CDC  and  the  OIE  list  was  included.  Second,
ny zoonotic  disease  listed  on  the  USDA  list  and
he CDC  list  was  included.  Third,  all  zoonoses
rom the  CDC  Category  A,  B,  and  C  Bioterrorism
gents/Diseases  list  were  included  [12]. Fourth,
eer-reviewed  literature  was  evaluated  to  capture
dditional  relevant  diseases  from  a public  health
ecurity perspective  (i.e.,  those  with  concerning
ransmissibility  characteristics  or  mortality  rates,
uch as  Ebola).  Fifth,  zoonotic  diseases  that  scien-
ists agree  are  not  a threat  to  public  health  (such
s vesicular  stomatitis)  were  excluded.  Sixth,  a
hysician with  speciﬁc  expertise  in  zoonoses  from
he George  Washington  University  Medical  Center
eviewed  the  tentative  list  and  recommended  13
dditional  diseases,  8  of  which  were  from  the  CDC
ationally  Notiﬁable  Disease  List,  that  should  be
ncluded.
Forty-one  zoonoses  of  interest  were  ultimately
dentiﬁed (Table  1);  these  diseases  were  consid-
red to  be  the  most  relevant  from  a biological,
ealth security,  and  policy  standpoint.  Although
ome of  the  diseases  on  the  list  had  never  been
etected in  the  United  States,  because  of  rapid
ravel, trade,  transport  and  the  documented  per-
eability  of  international  borders,  these  diseases
ere  included.
reating an outbreak database
he  database  was  created  in  Excel,  and  drop-down
enus with  discrete  choices  were  used  to  prevent
oding errors.
ata sources
he data  were  collected  from  publicly  available  lit-
rature dated  from  1998  to  2008.  This  date  range
as selected  for  two  reasons:  ﬁrst,  an  extended
eriod was  required  to  ensure  a  sufﬁcient  sample
ize for  statistical  analysis,  and  second,  modiﬁca-
ions occurred  to  the  U.S.  CDC  National  Outbreak
eporting System  in  2009,  which  resulted  in  sig-
iﬁcant  changes  to  the  scope  and  level  of  enteric
isease outbreak  reporting  [13].  As  such,  the  date
ange was  truncated  at 2008  to  improve  the  validity
f the  results.
Federal-level  data  were  used  because  disease
utbreaks may  cross  jurisdictions  and  state  repor-
ing requirements  vary  for  animals  and  humans
3—5]. Outbreaks  that  originated  outside  the  United
196  
Table  1  List  of  zoonotic  diseases  included  in
research.
Anthrax
Blastomycosis
Bovine  Spongiform  Encephalopthy  (including  variant
Creutzfeldt  Jacob  Disease)
Bovine  Tuberculosis
Brucellosis  (multiple  spp.)
Campylobacter
Coccidioidomycosis
Crimean-Congo  Hemorrhagic  Fever
Cryptococcosis
Ebola  Hemorrhagic  Fever
Ehrlichiosis/Anaplasmosis
Eastern  Equine  Encephalomyelitis
Glanders
Hantavirus
Histoplasmosis
Highly  Pathogenic  Avian  Inﬂuenza
Japanese  Encephalitis
Lassa  Fever
Leishmaniasis
Leptospirosis
Lyme  Disease
Malaria
Marburg
Monkeypox
Newcastle  Disease  Virus
Nipah/Hendra  (Henipavirus)
Novel  Inﬂuenza  A  Viruses
Plague
Psittacosis
Q  Fever
Rabies
Rocky  Mountain  Spotted  Fever
Rift  Valley  Fever
Salmonellosis
Shiga  Toxin  Producing  Escherichia  coli
St.  Louis  Encephalitis  Virus
Trichinellosis
Tularemia
Venezuelan  Equine  Encephalomyelitis
West  Nile  Virus
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States  but  were  detected  within  the  United  States
were  included.
The primary  data  sources  were  (1)  the  Morbidity
and Mortality  Weekly  Reports  (MMWR),  a  CDC  ofﬁ-
cial publication  also  used  by  Dato  et  al.  [9], and  (2)
ProMed-Mail  [14], a  moderated  open-source  system
that has  been  validated  as  a  useful  and  accurate
source of  information  in  prior  research,  including
in the  study  conducted  by  Cowen  et  al.  [14].
From 1998  to  2008,  all  MMWR  and  ProMed-Mail
records were  searched  for  the  diseases  described  in
Section ‘‘Identifying  zoonotic  diseases  of  interest’’.
a
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fter  this  step,  additional  data  were  collected
rom the  annual  report  that  the  United  States
ubmits to  the  OIE,  annual  reports  from  the  Nation-
lly Notiﬁable  Disease  Surveillance  System,  and
eekly  Epidemiological  Reports  produced  by  the
orld Health  Organization  (WHO).  Google  Scholar
nd Lexis  Nexis  were  then  used  to  capture  further
etails about  the  outbreaks  associated  with  detec-
ions that  were  previously  identiﬁed  by  MMWR  or
roMed-Mail.
eﬁnitions
n outbreak  was  deﬁned  based  on  a combination
f the  WHO  and  OIE  deﬁnitions  [15,16]. The  WHO
eﬁnes  an  outbreak  as
‘the occurrence  of  cases  of  disease  in  excess  of
hat would  normally  be  expected  in  a  deﬁned  com-
unity,  geographical  area,  or  season.  An  outbreak
ay occur  in  a restricted  geographical  area,  or  may
xtend over  several  countries.  It  may  last  for  a  few
ays or  weeks,  or  for  several  years.  A  single  case
f a communicable  disease  long  absent  from  a  pop-
lation, or caused  by  an  agent  (e.g.,  bacterium  or
irus) not  previously  recognized  in  that  community
r area,  or  the  emergency  of  a  previously  unknown
isease, may  also  constitute  an  outbreak  and  should
e reported  and  investigated  [15].’’
The  OIE  deﬁnes  an  outbreak  as  ‘‘the  occurrence
f one  or more  cases  in  an  epidemiological  unit’’
16].
For this  study,  an  outbreak  was  operational-
zed as  the  occurrence  of  one  or  more  cases  in
n epidemiological  unit  in  excess  of  what  is nor-
ally observed  geographically,  temporally,  or  in  a
peciﬁc population.  Lab-acquired  infections,  inten-
ionally dispersed  agents,  emerging  agents,  disease
ases from  novel  transmission  pathways,  and  cases
f drug-resistant  strains  were  also  deﬁned  as  out-
reaks.  This  deﬁnition  was  similar  to  the  deﬁnition
sed  by  Dato  et  al.  [9]  but  slightly  more  inclusive
o ensure  that  events  of  signiﬁcant  public  health,
nimal  health,  economic,  or  security  concern  were
aptured.
‘‘Who detects’’  was  deﬁned  as  the  individual
r entity  that  ﬁrst  detected  the  outbreak  (a  con-
rmatory  diagnostic  of  the  causative  agent  was  not
equired);  this  also  has  been  referred  to  as  initial
etection  or  initial  recognition  [10].  The  detection
ype in  the  cases  in  which  a practitioner  (ani-
al or  human)  submitted  a diagnostic  sample  to laboratory  without  a presumptive  diagnosis  were
onsidered  laboratory  detection,  whereas  type  of
etection  associated  with  the  cases  in  which  the
ractitioner  submitted  a  sample  with  a presumptive
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iagnosis  awaiting  conﬁrmatory  diagnostics  were
onsidered  practitioner  detection.
‘‘How fast’’  was  deﬁned  as  the  time  from  the
resentation of  the  ﬁrst  clinical  signs  to  the  time
hat the  outbreak  was  actually  detected  [9,10,17].
linical signs  could  be  self-reported  or  identiﬁed
y a  practitioner.  Despite  the  possibility  of  recall
ias or  reporting  error,  this  was  the  most  consis-
ent information  available  across  the  outbreak  data
nd avoided  confounding  the  incubation  period  with
imeliness.
ata ﬁelds  and  coding
 literal  content  analysis  was  conducted,  and  cod-
ng rules  were  developed  for  each  of  the  variables.
he outbreak  database  captured  22  pieces  of infor-
ation,  including  ‘‘whether  it  was  an  outbreak’’,
‘who detected’’,  ‘‘date  of  ﬁrst  case’’,  and  ‘‘date
f initial  recognition’’;  the  latter  two  ﬁelds  corre-
pond  to  ‘‘how  fast’’  a  zoonotic  disease  outbreak
as detected.  The  state  in  which  the  disease  out-
reak occurred  was  also  included  in  the  analysis.
The coding  criteria  ensured  consistent  coding  of
ach outbreak  from  the  primary  data  source  into
he outbreak  database.  For  further  data  veriﬁcation
nd validation,  two  secondary  coders  were  used
o validate  that  the  outbreaks  were  coded  consis-
ently  from  the  data  sources  to  the  database.  Ten
ercent of  the  outbreaks  (n  =  101)  were  coded  by
he secondary  coders,  which  resulted  in  the  veri-
cation of  220  data  points  (10  outbreaks,  22  data
oints per  outbreak).  The  primary  coding  was  con-
rmed for  96.8%  of  the  data  points  (213  of  220).
he discordant  coding  was  resolved  through  a small
lariﬁcation  in  the  criteria  used  for  coding,  which
as then  re-applied  to  the  coding  of  each  of  the
utbreaks  in  the  database.
tatistics
PSS  and  Minitab  were  used.  Univariate  statistics,
ncluding the  median  and  mean  times  to  detection
nd the  frequency  of  outbreaks  in  species  cate-
ories  (domestic  animals,  humans,  wildlife),  were
alculated.  Bivariate  analyses  were  conducted  to
nalyze relationships  between  the  variables,  and
he chi-square  test  (a  non-directional  test)  was
sed due  to  the  nominal  data.  The  statistical  sig-
iﬁcance  was  set  at  ˛  =  0.05,  which  is a customary
evel. These  analyses  did  not  determine  causal-
ty, but  explanatory  power  was  gleaned  in  cases  in
hich there  was  a  temporal  relationship  between
he variables.
Using  the  ‘‘how  fast’’  data,  Kruskal—Wallis  tests
ere used  to  analyze  the  differences  in  the  medians
or different  populations.  Dunn’s  post  hoc  method
o
d
b
1igure  1  Species  group  affected  by  zoonotic  disease
utbreaks  (n  =  101).
as  then  used  to  isolate  the  group(s)  that  was
were) signiﬁcantly  different  from  the  others  via
 multiple  comparison  procedure.  Although  the  H-
tatistic used  in  this  test  was  not  as  powerful  as  the
arametric  F-statistic,  the  Kruskal—Wallis  test  was
ore appropriate  for  the  non-normal  distributions
nd differing  sample  sizes  between  the  groups.
esults
our-hundred-and-forty  outbreaks  were  captured
n the  database,  and  these  outbreaks  were  dis-
ributed  relatively  evenly  between  1998  and  2008.
almonellosis  was  most  common  (86  outbreaks;
9.5%), followed  by  E.  coli  (Shiga  Toxin-producing;
8 outbreaks;  13.2%),  and  anthrax  and  rabies  (45
utbreaks each;  10.2%).
utbreaks with ‘‘who detects’’ and  ‘‘how
ast’’ data
f  the  440  outbreaks,  171  (36.4%)  included  ‘‘who
etects’’  data,  118  (25.1%)  had  ‘‘how  fast’’  infor-
ation,  and  101  (21.5%)  included  both.  These  101
utbreaks  were  further  analyzed,  and  the  results
howed that  they  appeared  in  42  states  and  the  Dis-
rict of  Columbia.  Temporally,  there  was  as  few  as
ne outbreak  per  year  (1996  and  1997)  to  15  per
ear (2006  and  2007).
pecies  affected  and  disease  agents
ver  half  of  the  outbreaks  (65;  64.4%)  were  docu-
ented  only  in  humans,  16  of the  outbreaks  (15.8%)
ccurred  only  in  domestic  animals,  and  12  of  the
utbreaks  (11.9%)  occurred  in  both  humans  and
omestic  animals  (Fig.  1). Of  these  101  disease  out-
reaks, rabies  was  the  most  common  (19  outbreaks;
8.8%), followed  by  salmonellosis  and  anthrax
198  H.A.  Allen
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Figure  3  How  fast  zoonotic  disease  outbreaks  were
detected.
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QFigure  2  Who  detected  zoonotic  disease  outbreaks
(n  =  101).
(17  outbreaks  each;  16.8%).  Of  the  41  diseases
listed in  Section  ‘‘Identifying  zoonotic  diseases
of interest’’,  25  diseases  with  complete  ‘‘who
detects’’ and  ‘‘how  fast’’  data  were  captured.
Who detects
The analysis  of  the  categories  of  entities  or  indi-
viduals detected  showed  that  human  laboratory
detections were  most  common  (33  detections;
32.7%), followed  by  physicians/clinicians  (19  detec-
tions; 18.8%),  and  State  Health  Departments
(16 detections;  15.8%).  In  the  ‘‘other’’  category
(14 detections;  13.9%),  county/city/district  health
departments,  herd  owners,  or  collaborative  efforts
were identiﬁed  (Fig.  2).
The human  and  animal  entities  were  collapsed
and then  differentiated  by  entity  type:  laboratories
(either animals  or  human)  detected  41  outbreaks
(46.1%), practitioners  (veterinarians,  physicians,
and  other  clinical  practitioners)  detected  30  out-
breaks (33.7%),  and  state  departments  detected
18 outbreaks  (17.8%).  The  ‘‘other’’  category  was
excluded  from  this  analysis  (n  =  89).
How fast
Out of  the  101  identiﬁed  outbreaks,  the  minimum
time to  outbreak  detection  was  0 days,  which  indi-
cates that  detection  occurred  on  the  same  day
that clinical  signs  were  ﬁrst  reported,  and  the
maximum time  was  492  days.  The  results  of  this
analysis showed  a  mean  of  31.7  days  and  a median
of 13  days.  Fig.  3  presents  a  histogram  of  these
data (n  =  101).  The  standard  deviation  was  65.7,
mainly  due  to  nine  high-value  outliers.  After  remov-
ing these  outliers  (n  = 92),  the  standard  deviation
decreased to  12.61,  with  a  mean  of  14.5.  The  dis-
tribution  of  these  data  was  not  normal  (using  the
Anderson—Darling  test,  AD-statistic  =  19.897).
At the  ‘‘fast’’  end  of  the  scale  were  outbreaks  of
rabies (detected  at  0 days)  and  of E.  coli  (detected setected  by  region  (n  =  101;  *  indicates  an  outlier;  median
hown  on  boxplot).
t  1 day),  and  at  the  ‘‘slow’’  end  of  the  scale  were
wo multi-state  outbreaks  of  salmonellosis,  which
ere detected  at  492  and  251  days,  respectively.
‘How fast’’  data  analyzed  by  region  of  occur-
ence. To  understand  whether  the  location  at
hich the  outbreak  occurred  impacted  the  speed
f outbreak  detection,  the  ‘‘how  fast’’  data  were
nalyzed  by  region.  ‘‘How  fast’’  was  statistically
elated (p  = 0.008,  H-statistic  =  13.78)  to  whether
he disease  outbreak  occurred  in  multiple  regions
as observed  in  Fig.  4).  Even  after  the  outlier
as removed  (492  days),  the  result  was  still
igniﬁcant (p  =  0.019,  H-statistic  =  10.77).2 Dunn’s
ethod  showed  a  statistically  signiﬁcant  differ-
nce between  the  multiple  and  Midwest  groups  and
etween the  multiple  and  West  groups  (p  < 0.05;
-value  =  3.052  and  3.026,  respectively).2 Additional outliers were not removed to maintain a larger
ample size for Dunn’s post hoc comparison.
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edian  shown  on  boxplot).
elationship  between  ‘‘who  detects’’  and  ‘‘how
ast’’ data
 further  analysis  was  performed  to  character-
ze the  relationship  between  the  ‘‘who  detects’’
nd ‘‘how  fast’’  data.  As  determined  using  the
ruskall—Wallis  test,  there  was  not  a  statistically
igniﬁcant relationship  between  the  entity  that
etected  (all  seven  entities  listed  in  Fig.  2)  and  the
ime to  detection:  the  H-statistic  was  10.77,  and
he p  value  was  0.096.
elationship  between  ‘‘who  detects’’  and  ‘‘how
ast’’ data  for  different  types  of  entities
ven  when  the  categories  were  collapsed  due  to
mall sample  sizes  into  three  groups  by  sector  (ani-
al entity,  human  entity,  and  other),  the  results
ere not  statistically  signiﬁcant  (H-statistic  =  1.30;
 value  =  0.522).  There  was  no  signiﬁcant  difference
etween the  ‘‘how  fast’’  data  for  zoonotic  disease
utbreaks  detected  by  animal  health  entities  and
he ‘‘how  fast’’  data  for  zoonotic  disease  outbreaks
etected  by  human  health  entities.
The ‘‘who  detects’’  categories  were  collapsed
y entity  type  rather  than  by  sector  into  state
gencies (n  = 18);  physician;  veterinarian,  and  clin-
cian (n  =  30);  and  laboratory  (n  =  41).  The  ‘‘other’’
ata  were  excluded,  resulting  in  n  =  89  because  they
ere not  easily  collapsible  into  the  previous  cate-
ories.  Fig.  5  shows  the  results  of  the  analysis  of
he ‘‘how  fast’’  data  by  the  ‘‘who  detects’’  data
nd the  entity  type.
The  results  of  the  Kruskal—Wallis  test  were  sig-
iﬁcant: H-statistic  =  13.51  and  p  value  =  0.001.  The
ull hypothesis  that  the  medians  of  these  groups
ere equal  was  rejected,  indicating  that  the  type
f entity  that  detected  a  zoonotic  disease  out-
reak  was  related  to  ‘‘how  fast’’  the  outbreak
as detected.  Dunn’s  method  was  used  to  assess
w
o
p
t199
he  differences  between  these  groups,  and  the
esults revealed  signiﬁcant  differences  (p  < 0.05;  Q-
tatistic) between  state  agency  and  clinician  and
etween  state  agency  and  laboratory.  As  observed
n Fig.  5, the  median  time  to  detection  for  state
gencies was  signiﬁcantly  higher  than  that  for  the
ther entities.
iscussion
hese  results  provide  the  ﬁrst  characterization  of
oonotic disease  outbreaks  in  the  United  States
rom 1998  to  2008.  The  predominance  of  human-
nly outbreaks  and  detections  in  these  data  was  not
urprising  given  the  focus  on  human  health  in  the
iterature.  Human  health  entities,  including  physi-
ians/clinicians,  state  public  health  departments,
uman disease  laboratories,  and  local  or  county
ealth departments,  detected  72.3%  of  the  out-
reaks captured.  It  may  be  useful  to  note  that  in  the
nited States,  rabies  (which  accounted  for  19  out-
reaks) is  typically  within  the  jurisdiction  of  public
ealth  departments,  even  when  detected  in  ani-
als.
When reviewed  by  entity  type,  this  research  pro-
uced  results  similar  to  those  reported  by  Ashford
t al.  [10], who  cited  that  36.3%  of  outbreak  recog-
itions  and  reportings  originated  from  health  care
rofessionals  or  infectious  disease  practitioners.  In
his study,  33.7%  of  the  outbreaks  were  detected  by
linicians, physicians,  and  veterinarians.  However,
oth Dato  et  al.  [9]  and  Ashford  et  al.  [10]  reported
 higher  percentage  of  outbreaks  detected  by  state
ealth departments:  53%  and  30.5%  respectively,  in
omparison to  17.8%  in  this  research.  In  large  part,
hese differences  are  likely  due  to  the  different
eﬁnitions of  initial  detection  in  each  of  these  stud-
es. Neither  Dato  et  al.  nor  Ashford  et  al.  attempted
o disaggregate  laboratory  detection  into  a cat-
gory and  instead  subsumed  laboratory  detection
nder state  health  departments  or  practitioners
epending on  who  subsequently  identiﬁed  the  out-
reak or  notiﬁed  authorities  when  the  diagnostics
ere complete.  Additionally,  the  prior  research
tudies have  not  focused  speciﬁcally  on  zoonoses
9—11].
The median  time  to  detection  (n  =  101)  was  13
ays, which—–considering  that  these  data  included
ard-to-detect  outbreaks  of  foodborne  diseases—–
as encouraging.  Given  the  outliers,  the  median
as signiﬁcantly  higher  (31.7  days).  The  number
f outbreaks  that  were  quickly  detected  was  sur-
rising  for  zoonoses  given  the  concern  regarding
he disconnect  between  animal  health  and  human
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health  surveillance  and  detection  systems.  How-
ever, these  results  were  aligned  with  prior  ﬁndings.
Although direct  comparisons  are  difﬁcult  due  to
sampling  differences,  Dato  et  al.  [9]  showed  a clus-
ter of  outbreaks  detected  within  the  ﬁrst  7  days,
which was  also  observed  in  this  research  (the  ﬁrst
quartile  was  6 days).  Chan  et  al.  [11]  cited  an  aver-
age of  15  days  to  event  detection,  which  was  similar
to the  mean  of  14.5  presented  in  this  research  after
the outliers  were  removed.  The  results  reported  by
Ashford et  al.  [10]  also  indicated  rapid  initial  recog-
nition,  with  only  0—26  days  between  the  beginning
of an  outbreak  and  the  time  at  which  an  individual
or institution  identiﬁed  the  problem.  The  congruity
of the  results  presented  here  with  those  in  the
existing literature  reinforces  their  reliability.
One of  the  most  signiﬁcant  ﬁndings  was  that  the
type of  entity  but  not  the  sector  was  related  to  the
median  time  to  zoonotic  disease  outbreak  detec-
tion. In  other  words,  there  was  not  a  statistically
signiﬁcant difference  between  how  quickly  human
health  entities  and  animal  health  entities  detected
zoonotic  disease  outbreaks.  Given  the  concern  over
the disparate  funding  and  focus  on  disease  surveil-
lance  strategies  and  systems  between  the  animal
health  and  human  health  sectors,  this  was  a posi-
tive ﬁnding  [6—8].  Prior  research  studies  have  not
attempted  to  associate  who  detected  the  outbreak
with how  fast  the  outbreak  was  detected.
The  analysis  of  the  entity  type  showed  that
clinicians detected  outbreaks  more  quickly  than
state departments  and  that  laboratories  made  the
detections  faster  than  state  departments.  This  is
not surprising  because  laboratories  perform  detec-
tions  based  on  diagnostic  conﬁrmation,  which  can
take time  to  perform.  State  agencies  detected  out-
breaks more  slowly  because  they  were  typically
aggregators of  broader  surveillance  data;  a  higher
incidence  level  in  space  or  time  may  have  been  nec-
essary to  trigger  recognition,  further  investigation,
and subsequently  detection.
Zoonotic  disease  outbreaks  that  occurred  in
more than  one  region  were  found  to  be  detected
more slowly  than  disease  outbreaks  that  occurred
in a  single  region.  This  is  largely  due  to  the  outlying
foodborne disease  outbreaks,  which  took  signiﬁcant
time to  detect.  Based  on  these  results,  it  remains
clear that  multi-state  foodborne  outbreaks,  despite
advances  in  the  analysis  of  subtyping  data  and
the rapid,  automated  collation  of  this  information,
were harder  to  detect  because  cases  often  occurred
gradually  and  over  a  wide  geographical  area.This evidence  highlights  the  importance  and
necessity of  practitioner  education  (both  physi-
cian and  veterinarian)  to  detect  zoonotic  disease
outbreaks;  these  individuals  are  the  ﬁrst  line  of
d
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efense  for  the  protection  of  both  public  health  and
nimal health.  Additionally,  the  role  of  both  human
nd animal  laboratories  in  zoonotic  disease  detec-
ion indicates  the  necessity  of  rapid,  speciﬁc,  and
ensitive  laboratory  tests  for  fast  recognition.
imitations
 key  limitation  of  this  research  study  was  that
here  is  an  unknown  denominator:  the  number
f zoonotic  disease  outbreaks  that  appeared  in
he data  sources  is  obviously  not  the  same  as
he number  of  outbreaks  that  actually  occurred;
hus, overgeneralization  of  these  results  should  be
voided because  individuals  and  states  may  elect
ot to  report  disease  cases  and  disease  outbreaks
ay or  may  not  be  detected  in  the  ﬁrst  place.
espite this  limitation,  this  study  provides  the
rst characterization  of  zoonotic  disease  outbreak
etection  in  the  United  States,  and  the  results  can
e used  to  inform  further  research.
There was  some  possible  bias  toward  rapid
etection for  diseases  with  acute  symptoms
ecause clinicians  may  have  identiﬁed  these  more
apidly and  individuals  may  have  been  more  likely
o recall  their  clinical  signs.  Additionally,  this
pproach  to  the  deﬁnition  of  timeliness  may  have
isadvantaged  animals,  which  cannot  recall  the
rst sign  of  disease  and  rely  on  astute  herd  owners,
anagers,  and  veterinarians.  However,  further
nalysis  was  performed,  and  there  was  no  relation-
hip between  the  primary  symptom  of  the  disease
nd the  median  days  to  detection  (p  = 0.872);  sub-
equently,  this  limitation  should  not  be  viewed  as
 signiﬁcant  threat  to  the  validity  and  reliability  of
hese results.
onclusions
hese  ﬁndings  provide  the  ﬁrst  characterization  of
oonotic disease  outbreak  detection  in  the  United
tates.  In  particular,  this  research  study  presents
ritical  empirical  information  with  regard  to  who
etected  the  identiﬁed  outbreaks,  how  rapidly
hey were  detected,  and  the  relationship  between
hese two  variables.  This  information  is  needed  to
nform more  complex  qualitative  and  quantitative
esearch, as  well  as  policy,  on  zoonotic  disease  out-
reak detection  in  the  United  States.
Overall,  the  general  rapidness  of  outbreaketection suggests  that  the  surveillance  and  detec-
ion systems,  even  though  they  are  disparate  and
isconnected,  may  be  more  effective  than  previ-
usly  described  in  theory.  However,  in  cases  with
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[haracterizing  zoonotic  disease  detection  in  US  
 highly  contagious  zoonotic  disease,  the  need  for
apid detection,  reporting,  and  response  cannot  be
verstated.
Further research  should  be  conducted  on  the
imeliness of  formal  reporting  (and  potentially  the
esponse)  rather  than  just  detection,  i.e.,  the  time
t which  the  disease  is  formally  reported  to  a  state
r federal  entity  and  when  or  if  there  was  any
esponse. Additional  analyses,  perhaps  using  pri-
ate records,  may  also  be  of  value  to  provide  a
etter understanding  the  reporting  completeness  of
oonotic diseases  in  both  human  and  animal  popu-
ations  in  the  United  States.
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